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ABSTRACT Aesthetics manifest a rationally ambiguous category of meaning that encom-
passes both relational and representational dimensions of communication.  In this paper, I
argue that (1) truth-claims have ontological consequences bound in the social commitments
and obligations generated through expressive choices and interpellated audiences; (2) onto-
logical implications entangle discourses of “truth” in the constitution of knowledge in ways
that extend beyond rational argumentation into aesthetic experience; and (3) a reinterpreta-
tion of Kantian aesthetics offers a framework for understanding how aesthetic experiences
influence the organization of relations of power.
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RÉSUMÉ L’esthétique représente une catégorie de sens qui est ambigüe en ce qui a trait à
sa rationalité et qui comprend des dimensions relationnelles et représentationnelles de la
communication. Dans cet article, je soutiens que (1) les prétentions à la vérité ont des
conséquences ontologiques sur les obligations et les engagements sociaux qu’engendrent les
choix expressifs et les publics interpellés; (2) les implications ontologiques mêlent les
discours sur la vérité et la constitution du savoir d’une manière qui dépasse l’argumentation
rationnelle pour atteindre l’expérience esthétique; et (3) une réinterprétation de l’esthétique
kantienne offre un cadre pour mieux comprendre comment les expériences esthétiques
influencent l’organisation de rapports de pouvoir.
MOTS CLÉS  Esthétique; Analyse du discours; Journalisme; Philosophie
Introduction
The enigma of aesthetics is surprisingly under-examined in the field of communi-cation studies. Broadly speaking, aesthetic experience encompasses the non-ratio-
nal and yet meaningful attributes of cultural expression. It is, in a sense, our first
encounter in culture, the experience before we make experience into meaning with
systems of understanding and rationality. But aesthetic experience is not, as some sug-
gest, the antithesis of knowledge. The fine and performing arts have rich traditions
that are not (at least, not usually) considered insane or false. We may be less comfort-
able speaking in aesthetic terms when it comes to discourses like journalism or sci-
ence—which may themselves view aesthetics as a contaminant—but this is an
oversight rooted in genealogical near-sightedness.
My interest in aesthetics stems from the political tension generated by truth’s in-
separability from power. What has been obscured in the careful segregation of dis-
courses of “truth” are the aesthetics at work in producing epistemic legitimacy, and
these in turn I suggest offer a way to encounter the genealogical distress of having to
resist “truth” in order to challenge relations of domination.
In the networked and spectacular condition of late-stage capitalism—or whatever
stage we might be in—increasingly dense and ubiquitous flows of cultural materials
manifest in a communicative milieu where pre-cognitive states of perception appear
to be growing in importance within procedures and “technologies”1 of public knowl-
edge and perceptions of social reality (Massumi, 2002). There is, some suggest, an “aes-
thetic turn” to be accounted for that has coincided with the erosion of unmitigated
faith in absolute forms of “truth” in Western thinking (Shusterman, 1989). But even
with these undeniable shifts in orientation, there remain certain deeply rooted divi-
sions between questions of truth, power, and communication on the one hand, and
questions of aesthetics, emotion, and enigma on the other. My argument in this paper
addresses this tension in two ways: first, by asserting that the pre-cognitive event of
aesthetic experience extends well beyond traditional notions of beauty and emotion
to encompass rationally ambiguous categories of experience that emerge from both
the relational and symbolic dimensions of communication; and, second, in making
the claim that by overlooking these categories of meaningfulness, we overlook an im-
portant opportunity for understanding in clearer terms how power moves through,
organizes, and is organized by communicative acts.
I should clarify at the outset that when I refer to “truth” what I mean is a truth-
claim: an intention on the part of an author/creator to represent what they believe to
be “indexical and referential presentations of the world” (Zelizer, 2004a, p. 187). My
inquiry is not concerned with the fidelity of that representation to an extant “real”
world, but rather with how these intentions are realized through communicative acts,
and in particular, the ways in which certain kinds of rationally ambiguous experiences
fundamentally inform textual outcomes intended to be true. As such, my analysis is
primarily concerned with understanding strategies engaged in the creation of truth-
claims (that is, and not with their effects), and more specifically, truth-claims within
the family of texts and textual practices in the genre journalism—generally speaking,
discourses in popular culture for both producing (through professional practices and
procedures) and for recognizing public “truth” (for example, by vigorously differenti-
ating between news genres and entertainment).2
Journalism is regularly described as being in a state of crisis in Western
economies. Sometimes overlooked in these accounts is that changes are not only re-
shaping media economies and professional conventions, but they are influencing
public perceptions and expectations of “truth” in popular media. John Hartley
(2000) calls it a shift towards a “redactional society,” where collective understanding
of public knowledge increasingly allows for the ongoing critical evolution of truths
in iterative rather than finite cultural procedures (Jones 2009). Within this increas-
ingly decentralized environment of cultural production, some kinds of traditional
boundaries are softening, for example, between news and entertainment, documen-
282 Canadian Journal of Communication, Vol 37 (2)
tary and fiction, truth and rhetoric, science and art, etc. (Bird, 2009; Lanham, 2006;
Shields, 2010). What is at stake in the perception of “crisis” is the future of public
knowledge and implications of its demise for democratic accountabilities. A better
understanding of how aesthetic experiences influence truth-claims helps to explain
why some of these changes can occur (for example, why the categorical distinctions
between fact/fiction and news/entertainment can be blurred) without precipitating
intellectual and political collapse.
In this article, I hope to rekindle the conversation about aesthetics among com-
munication and journalism scholars. My discussion is organized around three main
points. First, I take the position that traditional journalism’s quasi-monopoly over truth
in popular culture has generally ignored the ontological implications of its own en-
gagement and in particular the ways language and communication instantiate social
identities and social relations. These categories of experience are not easily accounted
for within the rational, provable domain of epistemic legitimacy, and yet they funda-
mentally inform the “epistemic rituals” delineating knowledge from its other; i.e., folly,
falseness, madness, or what Foucault (1986) called “subjugated knowledges” (see also
White 1973). As meaningful and yet extra-rational experiences, I argue that they reflect
a relational aesthetics at work in the communication of truth-claims, and further, that
they can be accounted for within a larger aesthetic framework (based on a reinterpre-
tation of Kantian aesthetics) that also encompasses paradoxical modes of apprehen-
sion and conceptual indeterminacy.
Within the meaning structures journalists use to describe the world, journalists
embed notions of integrity and with them they and their audiences have opportunities
to understand who they are and how they belong. Shared identities reflect the exem-
plary conditions of relationality that authors/creators embed into texts and that audi-
ences accept through practices of understanding. These identities represent a
fundamental paradox at work in human experience: that “being” is derived from two
contradictory states-of-affair; (1) an absolute distinction between self and other, and
(2) the immediate and contrary elimination of such a distinction through the shared
event/performance of understanding. It is not a question of the fidelity of meaning,
but rather an expectation of understanding, or a belief that it has occurred. These con-
trary elements of communication can be understood as aesthetic experience. Aesthet-
ics is the structure (at least one of the structures) of meaning through which legitimacy
of experience and eventualization occurs.3
Making (up) the news: Journalism’s ontological performances
Journalism wants to tell the “truth.” It is the genre in popular culture—and has been
for hundreds of years—for making claims whose relevance is based on an assertion
of accurately representing states-of-affair in the world (Zelizer, 2004a). But the
“truth” is not what it once was; and while many or even most communications and
cultural studies scholars have embraced frameworks that reject positivist underpin-
nings for “truth,” few have directed such critical inquiries at the discourses of jour-
nalism themselves. This is an oversight Barbie Zelizer (2004a) attributes to exactly
the epistemic tensions that arise between absolute and contingent understandings
of knowledge.
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It is, fortunately, a lacuna for which a resolution is in sight:
Recognizing that there is a reality out there and that, in certain quarters, truth
and facts have currency does not mean letting go of relativity, subjectivity
and construction. It merely suggests yoking a regard for them with some cog-
nizance of the outside world. And surely cultural studies is strong enough
these days to do that. (Zelizer, 2004b, p. 114)
Just such a reconciliation has been proposed, at least pedagogically, in a Canadian
context by Skinner et al., who suggest an approach to journalistic “truth” that focuses
on “the methodologies, languages, technologies, cultural assumptions, economic im-
peratives, and literacy systems through which it is sought and represented” (2001, p.
346). In other words, the suggestion is that reconciliation between absolute and con-
tingent forms of truth in a journalism context is to be found in the procedures and
practices of “truth.” Aesthetics—or perhaps more accurately stated, the handling of
aesthetic experience—I suggest, is one of those practices.
In The Order of Things, Foucault (1966/2008) described what Hayden White (1973)
calls “epistemic rituals,” changes in orientation in the collective impulse toward mean-
ing in Western thought that have epistemic consequences. These transformations
emerge through discourse—the changing social, cultural, economic, and intellectual
criteria and events wherein the conditions of possibility for knowledge are considered,
established, and played out. It is within these discursive formations that the boundaries
and controversies of public knowledge are negotiated through relations of power, with
some experiences meeting the criteria for knowledge and others being relegated to
the non-knowledge categories of folly, falseness, or madness. The rendering of knowl-
edge—its visibility and recognition as such—depends on excluding something else.
“Speaking,” as White puts it, “is a repressive act, identifiable as a specific form of re-
pression by the area of experience that it consigns to silence” (1973, p. 32). Discourse
formation produces two realms: that which can be known—knowledge, truth, et
cetera—and that which lacks the requisite criteria to be called meaningful, or what
Foucault called “subjugated knowledges” (1980, p. 82). 
The historical contingency of these categories is all but a banal observation. There
are at work, in Foucalt’s account, “in every society” overarching procedures of control,
selection, organization, and distribution of knowledge—modalities of inclusion/ex-
clusion, on the one hand, and internal modalities of classification, order, and distribu-
tion on the other (1986, p. 149). Within the categories of inclusion, there are two
overarching principles in Western terms: reason and truth, along with their limiting
conditions of folly and falseness (Foucault, 1986). It is my contention that aesthetic
experience rests on the threshold of the rational through procedures of definition, cri-
teria, and rituals of prohibition, or in other words, that aesthetic experience plays a
foundational role in the determination of what does and does not count as knowledge.
With this in mind, I return to the question of truth-claims in journalism. Even
today and despite its controversies, a central mode of apprehension at work in profes-
sional journalism is the notion of objective truth in news-making. The advent of mod-
ern professional forms of news in the late 19th and early 20th centuries linked objective
credibility with a “unity of method rather than aim,” in the words of Walter Lippman
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(quoted in Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007, p. 83; see also Tuchman, 1978), an approach
that emphasized a discipline of verification and organization of evidence in the pursuit
of positivist fact and which encouraged a profession of scientists rather than publicists.
As Stephen Ward (2004) points out, the “kind” of truth sought is inseparable from
the methods of its inquiry because its qualities are the presuppositions to which certain
avenues of investigation will necessarily proceed. In this sense, objective truth “regu-
lates” its methods of inquiry because it necessitates (and dictates) them. The goal of
objectivity “serves as a real-world constraint on our other goals” in the pursuit of jour-
nalistic truth (Ward, 2004, p. 272).4
Objectivity in journalism can have two very different orientations: (1) factuality,
and (2) impartiality, each with its own procedural emphases (Donsbach & Klett, 1993;
Hackett, 1984; Westerstahl, 1983). The difficulty in extracting either goal from the work
flows and conventions that produce them has prompted some observers to describe
journalism in performative terms: an attempt to “persuade readers that what it de-
scribes is real,” and in successfully doing so, transform interpretations into truth and
“into a reality the public can act upon” (Broersma, 2010, p. 26). These “performances”
work in part to conceal epistemological shortcomings through conventions, such as
through the use of genre (to suggest mimetic accuracy), framing, and assumed facts
(Broersma, 2010; Tuchman, 1978). Gaye Tuchman calls the use of objectivity in the
newsroom a “strategic ritual” designed to protect work against criticisms and stop-
pages in work flow (Tuchman, 1972). Conventions and styles present structures for
describing reality that transcend the individuals involved and the stories told to the
extent that they translate from one person to the next as part of the experience of
“truth.” The commonly employed analytical concept of media frames, for example,
only makes sense if what is communicated provides recognizable cognitive resources
for an audience to help them retrieve information from texts (Pan & Kosicki, 1993).
The importance of the relationship between news-maker and audience manifested in
the intended to-be-shared discursive space is not to be underestimated. Objectivity,
Ward claims, was “a rhetorical invention that emerged in response to a new journalism
audience relationship—the journalist as impartial mass informer” (2004, p. 33). The
relationship was central to the method, a relationship based on trust that helped to
overcome epistemic shortfalls (Ward, 2004). Frames, again as an example, are a way
of organizing shared values, but they do it in such a way that preferred readings (while
recognizing the potential for resistant decodings) more often than not are the ones
adopted by audiences (Entman, 1993; Iyengar, 1991; Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson, 1997;
Nelson & Kinder, 1996). Even Fiske (1987), who argues that the audience’s disruptive
powers of interpretation make television something of a “semiotic democracy” (p.
236), acknowledges what he calls strategies of “constraint” (p. 296) used by news-mak-
ers to interrupt and guide their viewers perceptions. “News controls the multivocality
of the real,” he writes, “by narrative structure and a careful selection of which voices
are accessed” (1987, p. 295).
One might rightly wonder which comes first, the journalist’s frame or its mean-
ingful reception on the part of audiences, and herein lies one of the enigmas of “truth”
in mediated forms. The participative quality of an audience’s interpretive experience
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shapes both content and relational attributes of a journalist’s work in (at least) two
ways: first, in that the journalist addresses someone, an audience; and second, in that
the composition of the text holds within in it traces of this consideration (frames, for
example). The news story in whatever form (print, radio, televisual, et cetera) is an
event—a performance—that arises when authorial expression encounters audience
reception, not unlike the interpretive performance described by Hans Gadamer
(1975/1989). In this encounter, the distinction between object (news/art) and subject
(audience) necessarily disappears. The structures and traces of whom an author thinks
she is addressing in a cultural text point to a middle ground or horizon where she, as
news-maker, intends and expects the event of understanding to occur.
In Robert Hackett’s widely cited critique of objectivity and the problems with bal-
ance and distortion as regulating principles in journalism, he argues for an ideological
understanding of news as epistemologically incapable of objectivity but well-suited
for expressing “concrete social relations” (1984, p. 238). Content analysis in this account
suffers from an inability to identify underlying structures of relations between denoted
symbols and how they come to be shared between news-makers and audiences, a
weakness addressed in part, for example, by a framing analysis that looks for ideolog-
ical foundations for understanding. Hackett argues that ideology in news acts to nat-
uralize social relations into “common sense” about the world we live in. It is through
the rules of impartiality and balance that these naturalizations take place, and not, as
is traditionally thought, in their lapse and absence. Interpellation invites the viewer
“to accept a certain position in order to read or decode the message” (Hackett, 1984,
p. 250). Together with realism—the performance of the real that is essential to news
legitimacy—interpellation transforms social relations of power into de facto forms of
“truth.” We are confronted by a discursive process that seems to have more in common
with magic than empiricism, and black magic at that, if we adhere to the belief that
the news should not manufacture truth. But such a fear overlooks in critical ways the
nature of language itself and how social identities and relations are instantiated in its
very make-up. Part of journalism’s naïveté is its refusal to acknowledge the ontological
implications of its communicative tasks.
Beneath the surface challenges of making “truthful” representations about the
world is a relationship between language and consciousness that is foundational to
human experience. “Intention” is the property of directing mental states at states-of-
affair in the world; i.e., events of the mind that depend on an orientation toward ob-
jects or events in the world (Searle, 1980). “All intentional states consist of a
representative content in a psychological mode,” writes Searle (1980, p. 43). That is,
they are mental states that allude to conditions of satisfaction oriented toward the
world. Intentionality and intentional relations are arguably at the root of all human
behaviour (Anton, 1999; Heidegger, 1982). Which is not to say—and this is the salient
point for present purposes—that meaning is derived solely from a process of internal
perception of the world, then translated through external language. Intentionality vis-
à-vis Heidegger describes human experience as recognizable only through the tempo-
ralizing necessities and constituting properties of language (Anton, 1998, 1999; Moran,
2000). “Being” in the world emerges through language; it is a tool found external to
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“being” used to disclose the world, but also that which constitutes the disclosure of
“being.” “Said most simply, we only make assertions about phenomena already fore-
had in some way” (Anton, 1999, p. 44). We do not encounter objects isolated and on
their own, but rather we encounter objects always in relationality and within contex-
tual wholes. Language is the medium through which we encounter a world in which
we already exist and that is transformed by our presence.
To break this down still further, the foundations of human meaning and commu-
nication are rooted in representations of conditions of satisfaction; that is, in commu-
nicating belief, intention, and/or desire (Searle, 2008, 2010).5 In its most basic form,
an uttered sound meets the conditions of satisfaction for the intention to make the
sound; i.e., the word’s meaning is the condition of satisfaction imposed on the sound—
for example, a sublingual grunt made to alert a friend of impending danger. But as a
symbol, this condition can only be met if my audience shares this intention. These are
“conventions,” justifiable linguistic and communicative expectations based on what
Searle (vis-à-vis Kant) describes as fundamental categories of human cognition such
as time, space, causation, et cetera, the particulars of which need not concern us, other
than to appreciate that they give rise to an expectation of understanding. What is per-
tinent to an aesthetic interrogation of journalism is what happens when we use lan-
guage to make public utterances intended to be true. We invest language with
commitments that Searle calls “deontologies” (from the Greek word for duty, deon);
that is, special reasons for action, such as rights, obligations, responsibilities, authori-
zations, permissions, and entitlements that at their most basic reflect the three orien-
tations to reality (i.e. belief, intention, and desire), but which, through layering, can
and do become much more complex (Searle, 2008). Collective intentionality expressed
through language accumulates deontologic commitments and, in doing so, reflects
beliefs in states-of-affair of the world: when people (collective intention) assign a func-
tion (make commitments to special reasons for action) to a person or object, they are
creating social facts through the obligations, rights, responsibilities, duties, entitle-
ments, authorizations, requirements, and so on, invested through the language choices
made. Friendships, for example, reflect the assignment of particular status functions
to a person (Searle, 2006, 2010). The political implications of this are readily apparent.
How we relate to one another arises at least in part through collective intentionality
and assignment of functions expressed through our linguistic choices. A brief com-
ment in passing from Searle acknowledges this: 
One sees the role of vocabulary in the activities of revolutionary and reformist
movements. They must try to get hold of the vocabulary in order to alter the
system of status functions. (2008, p. 454)
It is the use of language, a system of symbols used to represent collective intentionality,
that creates certain kinds of social commitments, obligations, and expectations that
implicate speakers and listeners in particular social realities.
Thinking back to the “middle-ground” where meaning is intended to be located
in the interaction of audience and text, and with a renewed appreciation for the im-
portance of collective intention in the use of language and consequent implications
for commitments and relations, we can begin to articulate some of the ontological im-
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plications of choices made by journalists, based on whom the journalist intends to ad-
dress. To be clear, it is not a question about an extant audience and how they actually
respond, but rather a question about how audiences might respond, how this influ-
ences decisions in the production process, and how these in turn play a role in the
constitution of relationships and identities.
Communication research has tended to focus on systems of symbols and their
content, but there are important constitutive dynamics at work in the relational di-
mensions of communicative events (Condit, 2005). Wittgenstein’s (2009, p. 185) notion
of “language games” is useful here for its suggestion that language derives meanings
from use and practices, that uses are always learned and engaged in particular contexts,
and the particulars of context will suggest conventions of use. Language is used differ-
ently in different situations—to give orders, to debate, to play sports, storytelling, rid-
dles, et cetera—and each situation presents a language game with its own rules and
expectations. One of language’s essential, if not primary, functions is arguably in the
maintenance of the relationships involved in the circumstances of its use (Canefield,
1981; Condit, 2005; Stewart, 1995; Wittgenstein, 2009).
News discourses have their audiences, and the assumptions that journalists have
about them will influence the intentions, commitments, and obligations expressed
within a text. It may in fact be impossible to conceive of persuasion of any kind (in-
cluding persuasion in the believability of a truth-claim) without taking account of its
intended audiences and their historically and socially contingent predispositions (Char-
land, 1995; Condit, 1990; Gross, 1999). Texts enable experiences for some and not for
others based on shared histories, knowledge, and cultural values (Condit, 1990).
Rhetorical failure, for example, often describes the ways in which universal assump-
tions fall short of the experiential and cultural variation in actual audiences.6 In this
sense, truth-claims in journalism are a kind of dialectic where the writer anticipates
an audience, anticipates that audience’s response, and then structures the writing ac-
cordingly in that direction. What makes this imaginary scenario more than just an in-
teresting attribute of writerly technique are the ways in which trust is bound up in
these anticipations:
Being able to talk with those around one with an expectation of, say, agreement,
sympathy, objection, execution, and so forth, and to have one’s expectations
in large part satisfied, is a part of what it is, as I have already mentioned above,
to trust those around one. [emphasis in the original] (Shotter, 2009, p. 30)
Beliefs about the audience, about the relationship with the audience, and about
how they will respond are embedded in language and communication; they are the
contextual expectations within which a particular communication exists. They are of
the language and yet transcend the specifics of utterance, suggesting that a dimension
of the journalist’s task is bound in relational expectations structured by belief and in-
tention—an understructure of beliefs, expectations, and desires, established through
the acts of utterance themselves and without which the communication would either
be meaningless or would mean something else altogether.
Bruce McKinzie (1994) calls this dimension of communication “integrity,” or the
ways in which our expectations about trust in relationships structure and are structured
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through our use of language. McKinzie found that among authors of letters to a Florida
newspaper, “truth” manifested in two irreconcilable ways: (1) truth as contingent,
which emerged in discussions about values; and (2) absolute forms of truth, which
emerged in stories about personal histories and experience. McKinzie’s respondents,
like most of us, unanimously believed that it is possible for people to act truthfully, that
is, to say what they mean, to do what they say they will, and to have done what they
say they have done. In other words, they believed it was possible to act with integrity,
and these expectations were “sedimented” in the personal experiences, histories, and
narratives that shaped their individual social understanding. A foundation of integrity
is the foundation of social life: “Without this realism and objectivism informing our so-
cial expectation, collective life becomes untenable” (McKinzie, 1994, p. 119). There is al-
ways honour, McKinzie suggests, because even among thieves, human existence is
social, and this involves expectations and obligations of trust. What trust provides,
through notions of integrity, is the basis for an expectation of understanding.
The absolute forms of truth, “sedimented” in experience and expectations of in-
tegrity, reflect what Heidegger (1962, p. 98) called a “primordial” relationship with the
world. Primordial “being” transcends the subject/object divide in that there is no di-
vide between the subject and those elements of the world that are submerged in pri-
mordial truth. The example Heidegger uses is an expert carpenter wielding a hammer,
which is not thought about in the act (quoted in McKinzie, 1994, p. 108-9; Heidegger,
1962). When a primordial truth stops working and is thus brought from a state of un-
conscious assumption to attention, it must then endure a dialectic justification to be
reintegrated into understanding (McKinzie, 1994). Our desire for integrity—that is, for
coherence and consistency with past and current expectations and obligations of
trust—is the foundation for understanding, and understanding (grounded in notions
of trust) is the foundation for expectations of understandability. In the publicly medi-
ated contexts of popular culture, where “truths” play out their expectations and obli-
gations of trust within discourses of journalism, the circle of inquiry will also include
regulatory desires and economic interests—a confluence of desires, identities, and gov-
ernmentality that Toby Miller (1998, p. 4) describes as “technologies of truth.”  
Miller’s (1998) “technologies of truth” emerge from popular culture organized
through the relations of power among audiences, regulators, and markets. At stake is
the subjectivity of citizens, in that popular cultures reflect negotiations over member-
ship, meaning, and governance as they emerge through the “cultural citizenships” of
a time and place (Miller, 1998). News is as much a resource for social identity as it is
an opportunity for understanding or governance. Journalists encounter meaning along
the event horizons of fictional intended audiences, and in doing so, extemporize their
expectations and experiences of social integrity. These expectations and assumptions,
whether explicit or implicit, constitute relations to the extent that audiences agree to
be interpellated by them in events of understanding—or better, they offer resources
for audiences in the production of identities, relations, and understanding. Harriman
and Lucaites (2007) have described how photographs in American news journalism
come to be iconic in large part because of the meaningful resources they offer for au-
diences encountering the tension between liberal individualism and democratic col-
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lectivism in the American polity. Although Harriman and Lucaites do not make the
point (theirs is a larger argument for the legitimacy and importance of visual commu-
nication as rhetoric), their iconicity is to some extent a reflection of the degree to which
the photographs have “knowledge effects” in the constitution of identity and relations.
In summary, the communicative procedures at work in traditional forms of jour-
nalism have embedded in them constituting functions of social relationality; that is,
in their performances of “truth,” there is to be found a constitutional expression of so-
cial reality within a dialectics with a fictional intended audience that instantiates social
expectations, obligations, and commitments based on exemplary states of relationality.
These elements emerge from perceptions of trust and integrity at work in creators/au-
thors who organize their integrities in part through the social identities of their in-
tended fictional audiences. Together, exemplary relationalities and social identities
provide the ground of sensibility on which the expectations of understanding and
shared meaning necessary for communication are based. 
Between power and knowledge
The categories of social identity and exemplary ethics described above express rela-
tional aspects of truth-claims that are difficult to “prove” in purely rational and em-
pirical terms; i.e., how do you “prove” a sense of belonging or a sense of integrity?
These reflect sensibilities that generally influence understanding through extra-cog-
nitive states, such as feeling, emotion, and affect (patriotism and rebellion, for exam-
ple). I would like to situate these aspects of communication into a larger aesthetic
framework based on a reinterpretation of Kantian aesthetics that helps to explain how
non-rational attributes of communication influence relations of power.
Aesthetics is a decidedly troubled, contested, and deeply ambiguous term
(Schusterman, 2006). And while this is not the place to rehearse the variegated his-
tory of aesthetic philosophy, there are a few important clarifications to be made be-
fore embarking on a more detailed discussion of an aesthetics of “truth.”
One of the key distinctions to be made for present purposes is between aesthetic
experience, emotion, and affect. Following the work of Brian Massumi (2002, p. 25),
“affect”—which I suggest is the raw ingredient of aesthetic experience—describes
the physiological “noise” of potential and “intensity” produced most immediately in
the experience of perception that arises but remains outside linguistic and cognitive
feedback loops. Affect taps into immanent self-organizing impulses that precede (ap-
parently, by about half a second) “positioning oneself in a line of narrative continuity”
with language, logic, reason, et cetera (Massumi, 2002, p. 25). It is, in Massumi’s terms,
the delocalized autonomic responses to the impingement of cultural encounter—the
infolding and contraction of potential interactions before intention unfolds through
expression in three-dimensional space. I propose aesthetic experience as a way to
help to explain how architectures of meaning, memory, and identity (in the event of
impingement) give rise to the autonomous physiological attributes of affect, such as
changing frequencies of galvanic skin response, heart rates, body temperature, and
breathing. Affect describes responses outside of the regulating influences of mean-
ingfulness and understanding (Massumi, 2002), and yet which necessarily arise from
within architectures of memory, meaning, and identity (for example, what exacer-
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bates one art patron’s shock might just as readily be considered banal by another).
Emotion is affect’s first positioning and limitation within cognitive structures (Mas-
sumi, 2002). Aesthetic experience, as intended here, is comprised of affect in Mas-
sumi’s sense of the word, but accounts for it from within the grounds of identity,
memory, and meaning, from which the affective potentials (in the form of autonomic
responses) emerge.
There is also an important distinction to be made between aesthetic analysis and
aesthetic experience (Fenner, 2003). The former describes an approach to understand-
ing expression—a mode of apprehension—that focuses on formal sensory attributes
alone and that decontextualizes cultural expression to engage in formal “aesthetic”
analysis. This is a use of aesthetics as an analytic approach in connection with fine arts
such as cinema, photography, painting, et cetera. David Fenner’s (2003) larger point is
to argue against this overly reductive understanding of aesthetics. Our most immediate
aesthetic responses, he argues—and I agree—arise from associations involving memory,
meaning, and understanding, qualities that in turn are responsive to social, moral, and
taste contexts. Aesthetic experience meant in this way describes the complexities of
experience in excess of the conceptual, and yet in relation to contextualizing influences.
Having settled out my use of the term from some of its more common variants, I
want to now turn to the aesthetics of Immanuel Kant whose Critique of Judgment
(1793/2001) is still considered one of the most comprehensive attempts to articulate a
philosophy of aesthetics and the limits of knowledge through judgment. Kant claimed
that knowledge arises through the experience of sensory perception organized through
a priori structures of the mind, including attribution to a unified consciousness and
fundamental categories, meaning time, space, and causality. Knowing, he speculated,
was the product of both empirical and transcendental phenomena. Kant understood
knowledge as arising in the perception and apprehension of the mechanical functioning
of nature (in accordance with the rules of time, space, and causality); morality, as arising
through human agency that exists of this world and yet operates independent of its
mechanical rules through the power of reason; and finally, judgment as arising in the
awareness of the universality of the cognitive assonance of the free play of imagination
and understanding and its harmony with the structure of the universe (Huges, 2006,
2007). Through judgment (i.e., aesthetic experience), we are able to translate the con-
ditions of possibility for knowing into freedom (Kant, 1793/2001, p. 278-9).
Kant proposed that aesthetic experience arises in the event of four “moments,”
which, in the interests of brevity, are a disinterested form of pleasure, grounded in the
absence of conceptual closure, with an awareness of the universal capacity for such
pleasure, and a feeling of necessity grounded in the expectation that everyone ought
to share in the pleasure (Hughes, 2006, 2007; Kant, 2007; Wenzel, 2005). These mo-
ments, as I hope to make clear in the ensuing analysis, can be reinterpreted as a way
of categorizing attributes of aesthetic experience. Together, they offer a resilient frame-
work for understanding how non-rational attributes of truth-claims can be used to
mobilize relations of power in both relational and representational terms.
To be clear, unlike Kant’s model, as categories of attribution, these are not “mo-
ments” which must all be in play in order for aesthetic experience to occur. Rather, I
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am arguing that they provide a helpful analytic framework for categorizing experiences
that can be described as aesthetic and that influence the eventualization of truth and
power. Restated then (from Kant), the first moment references a disinterested mode
of apprehension, arguably one of the most controversial of the claims because of how
“disinterest” can be used politically. Pierre Bourdieu (1984) saw in Kant’s disinterested
mode procedures of class “distinction” that privileged an ability to ignore and to with-
draw from economic realities. He likened it to maintaining a “child’s relation to the
world” that responds to surfaces and ignores political context (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 54).
Bourdieu’s sociological critique of Kant reveals the limitations of Kant’s universal in-
terpretation of human experience, what Bourdieu labelled as “nothing less than the
monopoly of humanity” (1984, p. 491).
Even accepting this critique, there remains the aesthetic experience itself; i.e., the
extra-rational and pre-linguistic dimensions of communication and cultural experi-
ence that, despite these epistemic shortcomings, remain meaningful, such as the ways
we assimilate meaning intuitively and emotionally before we rationalize them into ex-
perience. A disinterested mode of apprehension can be understood as a framework
for understanding. Jonathon Loesberg calls it “symbolic embodiment,” a mental con-
struct which assumes absolute independence from the bases of the object observed,
its causes or intended purposes: “symbolic embodiment does not describe the real
features of artworks; it describes how we interpret an object when we construe it as
artwork” (2005, p. 7). Even sociological critiques of aesthetic experience like Bourdieu’s
do not address all aspects of the experience. For example, aesthetic experience cannot
be forced in the sense that the experience of beauty cannot be forced or rationally pro-
duced, nor can our pre-cognitive states be forced upon us. Our intuitive, affective, emo-
tional, immediate, prelinguistic, and embodied responses manifest independent of
coercion, although, as Bourdieu argued, the responses themselves can be put to polit-
ical use. Loesberg (2005) convincingly argues that Bourdieu himself engages in an aes-
thetic mode of analysis in his notion of habitus—his disinterested approach to
fieldwork. By reading the field in terms of its surface indicators and seeking insight in
their rearrangement rather than through some kind of hermeneutics, Loesberg (2005)
argues that Bourdieu’s habitus depends on a mode of disinterest, the attempt to sever
all ties between subject and object, and the perception of the object as existing for its
own sake.
Paradoxically, recognition of disinterest as a mode of apprehension makes it pos-
sible to also consider its opposite mode of apprehension that deracinates the distance
between subject and object altogether. “[I]t is esthetic to the degree in which organism
and environment,” John Dewey wrote, “cooperate to institute an experience in which
the two are so fully integrated that each disappears” (quoted in Jay, 2003, p. 20). In
similar fashion, Nicolas Bourriaud (2002) argues for an understanding of art as that
which occurs in the interaction between artist and audience, or what he called “rela-
tional aesthetics.” And Grant Kester (2004) describes politically engaged art as “dia-
logical aesthetics” and the inter-subjective production of relationships and social
reality. It is hard to deny that something happens in the encounter of audience with
art. Gadamer (1975/1989) describes it as the simultaneous events of expression (object)
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and reception (subject), which cannot be compared independently (see also Vattimo,
2008). As described earlier, in this sense, the meaning of art resides in this “interpretive
performance” where the distinctions are erased between subject and object, “for an
encounter with the language of art is an encounter with an unfinished event and is it-
self part of this event” (Gadamer, 1975/1989, p. 85).
Gadamer also employs the metaphor of “play” in describing this encounter in the
way that a player playing a game plays something. Within that necessarily voluntary
and improvised gesture lies the experience of encounter.It is a mode of apprehension
and way of knowing that challenges dominant epistemological assumptions. Feminist
scholars, for example, have strived to illuminate relations of power that systematically
and strategically ignore attributes of knowledge that are both objective and subjective,
such as the way we know people and how our knowledge of them is both necessarily
incomplete—even though we still know them—and dependent on who the knower
is (or in other words, that objective qualities of reality can be open to social structuring
depending on who is experiencing them) (Code, 1991).6
A disinterested mode of apprehension emphasizes the distinction between subject
and object, a distance imagined to its extreme limit; and the elimination of the gap
between subject and object emphasizes the inter-subjective foundation of experience.
It is a paradox, but it is not incomprehensible. On the one hand, the aesthetic mode
grounds its critique in a self-reflexivity that measures possibility against the precondi-
tions of knowing: what is it possible to know without preconditions? On the other
hand, it is a mode grounded in the loss of subjectivity altogether (and objectivity) and
privileging of a co-relational alternative. Each is dependent on the possibility of the
other: there must be a space of dissension and the possibility of reversibility and re-
arrangement in order for an alternative to emerge (in the same way that freedom is
the condition of possibility for power).
To put this in more practical terms, the less than rational and yet still meaningful
category of a disinterested mode of apprehension has contemporary allegiances
within discourses of traditional journalism, science, and jurisprudence, among others.
Objectivity, positivity, and justice trade in speculation of the possibility of subject and
object severability. And within contemporary art discourses meaning is understood
as emerging through the elimination of subject and object through performance and
encounter. But there are new and emerging forms of commentary on social reality
that paradoxically encompass both modes simultaneously. For example, participatory
forms of journalism (i.e., alternative media that report from within communities
whose events also comprise objects of reportage) often strive to replicate traditional
methods of verification that rely on objective forms of truth, but they do this by struc-
turally conflating subject/object categories through conventions of reporters writing
about themselves and their own communities. This gesture eliminates what Kevin
Howley (2005, p. 3) calls the “convenient fiction” of an assumed gap between media
producers and media consumers and renders “disinterested” reports sensible only
within deeply interested contexts.
Disinterest in this sense is not a point of view that needs to be adopted by news
audiences, but rather, is a structure for understanding adopted by some news produc-
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ers and understood as a structure of understanding by their audiences. It is a mode of
apprehension altogether different from that brought to bear on a theatre performance,
a conundrum made even more readily absurd by imagining theatrical expectations of
knowing brought to bare on a scientific report. The sensibilities would be scrambled—
perhaps, not without some interesting outcomes—but their intended meanings and
territories of sensibility would for the most part be hopelessly disordered.
These paradoxical qualities of contrary modes of apprehension touch on a more
encompassing (and more recognizable, at least in terms of contemporary arts practices)
representational category of aesthetic experience, one derived from Kant’s second mo-
ment, i.e., conceptual indeterminancy, or ambiguity. Aesthetic experience is experience
that resists easy rational organization and whose sensibility—for example, through af-
fect and emotion—is in terms other than rationality. Extra-linguistic, non-conceptual,
extra-logical, affective, and emotional are all, in a sense, qualities of meaningfulness
that defy reason. And yet, ambiguity is arguably one of the most “truthful” states; i.e.,
the impossibility of knowing. Methods of understanding are as much concerned with
limiting ambiguity as they are with clarifying “reality.” Objectivity, in this sense, and
traditional methods of journalism, are ways of reducing reality to a knowable fragment
of reality (Cramerotti, 2009). Introducing ambiguity, then, suggests a means of chal-
lenging some of the relations on which dominant forms of knowledge rest.
The deep ambiguity at work in aesthetic experience is also apparent in Kant’s
third moment: the necessary shareability of aesthetic experience (the ought of an en-
counter with beauty, what Kant described as an awareness that everyone can recognize
beauty and, in the right circumstances, ought to experience it) that gives rise to a nec-
essarily indeterminate state of meaning, grounded in future terms; i.e., an exemplary
state of meaningfulness. The expectation of communicability and meaning is compa-
rable to the trust conditions necessary for the linguistic integrities described in the pre-
vious section. Kant’s universal is grounded in part on the a priori intuitions that
organize fundamental categories of knowing; i.e., categories of meaning without which
there can be no experience, including time, space, causality, quality, quantity, modality,
and relation. But what is at stake here is the necessity of communicability, an expec-
tation of communicability that grounds aesthetic experience in the possibility of
shared sensibility. This is an orientation of affect (in Massumi’s sense of the term) that
comes from within structures of both past experience and future expectation of com-
mon sense. What this does in part is relocate conceptual certainty into future, and
therefore indeterminate, terms, while allowing for the constitution of social reality
within the event of communication itself through commitment, obligation, and ex-
pectation, as described above. Exemplary conditions necessitate extant realities, the
instantiation of which manifests aesthetically through communication. The effects of
power mobilize relations in the interests of power as a “structure of actions brought
to bear on possible actions,” with the goal of “guiding the possibility of conduct and
putting in order the possible outcome” (Foucault, 1982, p. 789). Put differently, power
is largely about limiting and ordering future outcomes. Aesthetic experience’s ambigu-
ous and exemplary sensibilities suggest at the very least the possibility of meaningful-
ness independent of relations of domination.
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Which is not to deny, it should be said, the worst manifestations of politics and
aesthetics. As Walter Benjamin (1968) pointed out, aestheticized politics can be the
logical outcome of fascism, a politics of seductive spectacle engendered through the
use of symbols, myths, and rites rather than reason and which can transform even
human suffering into decontextualized forms of aesthetic pleasure (see also Jay, 2003).
The manifestations of aestheticized politics (in Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, and com-
munist Russia, for example) have significantly undermined utopic expectations for
the alchemy of radical politics and art.
But a “post-utopic” interest in the emancipatory potential of aesthetic experience
(albeit divorced from radical politics per se) has persisted under the rubric of the
avant-garde (Rancière, 2004). Rancière (2004, 2008) describes both strategic gestures
in the art world that reflect political intelligence in the sense of military-strategic—
i.e., shock value, outrage, rupture—and future-oriented gestures that attempt to pres-
ent preferred and unprecedented relations for public consideration. In the latter,
conceptual stability is rerouted to some future undetermined condition, in a sense,
an ambiguous exemplary rooted in modes of participation and playfulness. Krzysztof
Ziarek (2004) argues that avant-garde aesthetics do not resist the effects of power,
but rather deny them and constitute a time and space configuration without power
as its grounding orientation. Ziarek argues that it is the conditions of possibility of
“being” that are rearranged. Art’s most radical potential instantiates a ground of
“being” before power, an opening of relations before their differentiation into power
and powerless, creating rupture and the possibility for radically unprecedented rela-
tions. Aesthetic experience, and its indeterminacy, can alter the conditions of possi-
bility for the object of power itself.
Jean-François Lyotard found in Kant’s aesthetics the idea that affect as emotion
and sentiment manifests outside the bounds of domination, and that affect is a sign
of freedom (Gearhart, 1999). 
[I]t is in his reading of the Second Critique that the connection between feel-
ing and freedom emerges clearly—when Lyotard stresses that the sense of
obligation is a feeling, and that that feeling is for Kant the sign of human free-
dom. (Gearhart, 1999, pp. 104-105)
The link between feeling and obligation is important. The bonds of social expec-
tation, obligation, and commitment manifest within truth-claims depend in part on
affective dimensions of experience, including emotion but also in Massumi’s sense
of pre-linguistic, pre-cognitive responses that emerge from and merge with the local-
izing structures of reason, memory and meaning. Lyotard (as cited in Gearhart, 1999)
was trying to understand colonial reality in Algeria and its subsequent and seemingly
sudden rupture through violent revolution in 1954. Lyotard believed that such sudden
violent upheaval pointed to a social reality constituted by emotion and feeling, and
that just as the emotional bonds of colonial reality “on some level [were] freely made”
by Algerians, “the links connecting them with that society could be broken freely
and virtually overnight” (Gearhart 1999, p. 104). Just as no one can be forced to play,
no one can be forced to feel an obligation to society, only made to behave in certain
ways. Aesthetic experience presents the possibility of a feral way of knowing.
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Foucault argued near the end of his life that we must “create ourselves as a work
of art” (1984, p. 351). It is an aspirational ethics, rooted in future indetermination rather
than past prescription, a sense of creation rather than discovery. Foucault’s path to
freedom—or at least the possibility of transcending conditions of possibility for sub-
jectivity—lay in self-review and self-making, with a sense of “truth” not defined by
correspondence to reality, but rather “as a force inherent to principles and which has
to be developed in a discourse”; not a hermeneutical “truth,” but rather “something
which is in front of the individual as a point of attraction, a kind of magnetic force
that attracts him towards a goal”; “truth” that emerges from the desire to constitute
the self rather than discover it (2007, pp. 163-164). The aesthetic self is a perpetually
incomplete project of plurality, a strategy rather than a prescription, a “style of exis-
tence” that resists preconditions of possibility in the way that style and form resist nar-
rative determination (Ferguson, 1999, p. 130).8 Foucault’s aesthetic self exists without
a determined end, without a defined narrative, but with possibility for action in the
present, arrived at through consideration of past experience and undetermined future
possibility. It is a rerouting of relations of power through the manifestation of exem-
plary meanings and validities.
Finally, from Kant’s fourth moment, we get the idea of sensus communis, which
emphasizes the sense of belonging at work in shared sensibilities; that is, common
sensibilities into which we subjugate individual identities into collective ones within
the structures of integrity that regulate our relationships with society. There is in the
idea of communicability the necessity of shared sensibility, or what Kennan Ferguson
calls an “aesthetic conception of identity” (1999, p. 13). “We do not, in other words,
make judgments; judgments make us,” and through them we constitute human soci-
ety (Ferguson, 1999, p. 13). What Kant proposed as a universal category of aesthetic
moral agreement can be more sensibly recognized as an historical circumstance of
shared values, preferences, and orientations through which aspects of social identity
and a sense of belonging are established. Who we think we are, and with whom we
think we are communicating, as discussed at length in the previous section, is of central
importance in mediated experiences of “truth.”
What makes this theoretical maze worth navigating is the insight that such an ad-
mittedly awkward initial framework offers into how extra-rational attributes influence
discourse. To recap, my approach to aesthetics (specifically, an aesthetics of truth-
claims) takes as its starting orientation Kant’s aesthetic moments as a sketch of the
limits of knowing through judgment. We find in these limits a tentative framework
and four categories of aesthetic experience: social identity, ambiguity, exemplary mean-
ingfulness, and paradoxical modes of apprehension. Aesthetic experience, unlike
knowledge, is rooted in the conceptually indeterminate, in excess of rationality, where
affect encounters but is not yet positioned into the narratives and logics of understand-
ing. Affect emerges autonomously in association with and within a base network of
memories, experiences, expectations, identities, and contexts that offer the promise
of meaning, or, a feeling that ought to be sharable and a capacity for judgment that
presupposes the possibility of common sense. Even if consensus, as Foucault (1984)
suggests, is empirically unachievable, the expectation of common sense is the necessity
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of language. Aesthetic experience, as (re)distribution of sensibility, can, as it has in
various avant-garde art settings, create possibilities for unprecedented world space and
futures that only instantiate where meaning is voluntarily engaged (like play). In such
an arrangement of relations, sensibility depends on the absence of domination, where
subject and object correlate meaning, and conceptual closure and understanding lie
off in the future. Aesthetic experience encompasses paradoxical modes of apprehen-
sion that regulate how the dynamic between subject and object—audience and per-
formance, public and art, citizen and news—unfolds. On the one hand, it suggests a
self-reflexive concern with a rearrangement of elements rather than their causes and
purposes. It is, to overstate it, an anti-hermeneutical approach grounded in the idea
of disinterest. A disinterested mode of observation is rooted in speculation about the
possibility of reversibility, of absolute unrelatedness between subject and object, but
also, and coincidently, in the reversibility of relations of power, a fact emphasized by
its obverse mode of apprehension, which encounters subject and object as merged in
a performative and mutually constituting experience. To the extent that power needs
to predetermine outcomes of conduct, aesthetic experiences appear to describe cate-
gories of meaningfulness through which the expectations of power, including its truths,
can be disordered.
Conclusion
The changes percolating in popular cultures concerning “truth” are reflected in and
reflective of changes taking place in more scholarly conversations, including within
the field of communication studies. Basic tenets of traditional communications re-
search, such as assumptions around representational meaning and fidelity character-
istics of messages, are being uprooted in the wake of post-structuralist and
post-modern critiques (Motley, 1990). The assumed distinctions between fact and
value, the integrity of the sovereign subject, and the primacy of a representational epis-
temology can no longer be assumed (Stewart, 1991). Possibilities for understanding
communication are being considered through a rubric of ritual rather than exchange,
a shift that emphasizes language’s improvisational role in the creation of subjectivities,
relationships, identities, and knowledge (Carey, 1989; Craig, 1999). Robert Craig has
suggested an as yet unrecognized “aesthetic tradition” in communication studies,
awaiting articulation, that would emphasize the embodied and performative aspects
of communicative events (Craig, 1999).
In this article, I have argued that aesthetic experience offers an approach to un-
derstanding both relational and representational aspects of truth-claims not easily ac-
counted for within rational and empirical frameworks. On the one hand, the aesthetic
experiences of ambiguity and our modes of apprehension address the symbol systems
at play in cultural texts and shape how understanding is intended and can occur in
the encounter between audience and text. The regulation of ambiguities delimits, or
intends to delimit, the degree to which audiences can participate in the production of
understanding. It is a way of instructing understanding, or inviting understanding, or
even at times intentionally prohibiting understanding. The regulation of ambiguity is
often how authors/creators try to create middle grounds for preferred horizons of in-
terpretation. Similarly, the intended modes of apprehension at work among
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authors/creators will have an impact on the meanings of symbols in question. An ob-
jective approach to knowledge imagines the reversibility of what is represented, that
a subjective position can exist absolutely severed from the objects of its encounter. Sci-
ence engages an objective mode of apprehension, as do traditional forms of profes-
sional journalism. Yet, to approach a scientific study in terms of its poetics, or to
approach a ballet in terms of the objective knowledge being produced, is an entirely
different kind of encounter that tests the boundaries of sensibility. Systems of symbols
have their rules, and the modes of their apprehension engaged will influence funda-
mentally how the rules should be employed to make sense of the encounter.
On the other hand, communicative events take place in relational contexts. The
aesthetic experiences of sensus communis and exemplary understandings are rooted
in the relational dimensions of language—the conditions and terms under which we
subsume our individual subjectivities into senses of belonging (or not), and our ex-
pectations of integrity (our own integrities and the integrities of others). From the ex-
pectations, obligations, and commitments inherent in truth-claims, we instantiate
social realities. What makes this confounding, but also what draws us through our
communicative acts into the constituting origins of relations of power, is that we have
made up elements of the terms of social reality that ground meaning in our commu-
nication. It is as complicated and as simple as our ability to do what we say we will do.
The diverse arrays of status, expectation, obligation, and commitment that make up
relations of power are constituted, at least in part, through our own relational engage-
ments when we make truth-claims.
By emphasizing what is a neglected area in communications thought, my hope is
to perhaps (re)kindle scepticism about how, in particular, the genre of journalism reg-
ulates the aesthetics of “truth” in popular culture. News conventions and styles today,
under siege though they may be, are linked to objective, empirical, and positivist no-
tions that emerged in late 19th and early 20th century conversations about science and
propaganda. It is not the sociological or political value of “truth” that is in question, I
suggest, but rather an aesthetic blindness. In the rush to squeeze out falsity, inaccuracy,
ideology, and propaganda that formed the ground from which our contemporary vi-
sions of professional journalism emerged, the aesthetic dimensions—what I argue are
part and parcel of all truth-claims—were intentionally or inadvertently swept under
the empirical rug. The error in this is to conflate a convention of style with the social
value of indexically referential symbolic meaning, and to confine public communica-
tion of “truth” to an overly narrow aesthetic range. Once we can identify conventional
journalism’s aesthetic “habits,” it may be possible to admit a greater diversity of styles
of “truth” into the hallowed houses of news.
If, that is, this still matters, since many of these changes are happening outside of
journalism’s careful regulation. The unbridled proliferation of aesthetic strategies ac-
ceptable to audiences as forms of information about the states-of-affair of the world
(such as The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, graphic novels, blogs, art installations,
et cetera) is at least part of the reason why so many are so worried about a so-called
“crisis in journalism.” A better understanding of the dynamic between aesthetics and
“truth” in popular culture may help to explain why such shifting sensibilities are not
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only not fundamentally destabilizing in any political, social, or intellectual sense, but
rather are a welcome loosening of a form of epistemic monopoly long held by the
guilds of news-makers over what counts as “real” in public discourse. 
Notes
1. Toby Miller (1998) describes the emergence of public knowledge from within the tension between
state interests, market interests, and public desire as “technologies of truth.”
2. I hope to expand the aesthetic boundaries of what can be considered news.
3. “Eventualization” is Michel Foucault’s term for the point at which the legitimacies of power and
boundaries of knowledge are made evident in the “connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays
of forces, strategies and so on which at a given moment establish what subsequently counts as being
self-evident” (1991, p. 76).
4. Early textbooks for journalism emphasized practice over philosophy and generally ignored questions
of epistemological legitimacy. Their concern focused instead on questions of routine: how to identify
a good story (timeliness and emotional appeal); how to collect information (through interviews); the
importance of balance; the importance of form (inverted pyramid, descending hierarchy of impor-
tance); and the role of journalist as offering a mirror of society—all attributes that have had tremen-
dous longevity and even today continue to shape assumptions about professionalism (Sumpter, 2009).
5. The condition of satisfaction for “belief” is a states-of-affair in the world that matches our belief. The
condition of satisfaction for “intention” is creating or carrying out the states-of-affair that was intended.
And, the condition of satisfaction for “desire” is the states-of-affair that fulfills that desire (Searle, 2008,
2010).
6. Condit (2005) is criticizing the traditional canon of rhetorically great speeches as being more accu-
rately described as invitations to understanding to a particular group of people, emerging from com-
monality of culture, race, grammar, educational dispositions, and ideologies (i.e., a canon largely
comprised of speeches by white educated men). It is not a political conspiracy (at least not in every
case), but rather a necessary condition of rhetoric’s work and a demonstration of how relations of
power can be implicated, expressed, and created through authorial intention.
7. Recognition of epistemologies based on different criteria of legitimacy—sometimes called alternative
or resistant epistemologies—is an expressly political engagement with ways of knowing that reject
the traditional dualism of mind/body and with it the devaluing of embodied experiences of the effects
of power in favour of situated and dynamic ways of knowing (Larrabee, 2006).
8. Narratives require closure in the sense that there must be a beginning and end in order to transform
“the welter of facts that is historical reality” into meaning (Stone-Mediatore, 2003, p. 30). Actions never
end in the world in the sense that they continue in perpetuity through reactions that generate more
actions, et cetera. Narratives—the ascribing of meaning to experience—necessarily involve choosing
endings that link together actions in meaningful ways (Arendt, 1958; Stone-Mediatore, 2003).
9. Mitchell agreed to make the change, in part, because of alliances she had made in the local Aboriginal
community with an organization called APES (Aboriginal People Excited about Sasquatches). During
the exhibition, APES organized a public discussion with Mitchell and others about sasquatches, Aboriginal
knowledge, and colonialism.
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